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ADOPTING THE RULE OF
REASONABLE USE: MORE
PROBLEMATIC THAN HELPFUL
HEINS IMPLEMENT Co., ET AL. V.
COMM'N, ET AL.'
byJASON W. JOHNSON
he flow of surface water has presented
problems throughout the history of
American law. The rights of landown-
ers in discharging unwanted water from land
became entangled with the rights of other
landowners not to be injured by the acts of
their neighbors. The common enemy doc-
trine was the earliest common law doctrine
adopted with respect to landowners' rights in
diverting the flow of surface water. The
common enemy doctrine has since been
supplanted in a number of jurisdictions by
the civil law rule (also called the natural flow
rule) and the rule of reasonableuse. Even the
common enemy doctrine itself has been
modified in some jurisdictions to include
some reasonableness standards. Until the
present case was decided, Missouri followed
MISSOURI Hwy. & TRANSP.
a modified common enemy doctrine. That
doctrine has now been abandoned, and
replaced with the rule of reasonable use.
I. FAcrS AND HOLDING
Heins Implement Co. and neighbors
(Appellants) own or rent commercial and
agricultural propertyneartheWakenda Creek
river bottom. 2 At this location, Highway 65
runs north-south, and Route 10 runs east-
west.3 Before 1975, Wakenda Creek often
flooded after heavy rains.4 The water ran
over Route 10 and gathered in a small
artificial lake.' When this lake exceeded
capacity, the water would run east over
Appellants' lands although it never reached
their buildings, before crossing Highway 65
and rejoining the creek further downstream.6
To build a bypass for Highway 65,
Respondent, the Missouri Highway and
Transportation Commission, ("MIHTC"), con-
demned some of the property owned either
by Appellants or their predecessors in title.7
Mel Downs, chief design engineer for the
project (and an employee of MHTC), de-
signed a five-foot culvert under the bypass to
handle normal drainage.8 He testified that he
did not know about the history of flooding in
the area, but that he thought the culvert
could handle normal rainfall drainage.9
Downs admitted that the culvert was inad-
equate to drain the creek's other normal
overflows.' 0 In July 1981, after the bypass
was completed, a flood occurred and the
raised road, when coupled with the inad-
equate drainage, acted as a dam. This
caused flooding of a much greater degree of
severity than before." Many buildings had
up to thirty inches of water in them, and the
water remained for seven daysY Similar
floods occurred at least five times over the
next nine years.'3
Appellants filed suit in 1985 against
MHTC, Mel Downs, Trager & Sons (the
contractor), and Carroll County Recreation
Club (the owner of the lake).' 4 The trial court
granted summary judgment, denying Appel-
lants' claims against the contractor, the engi-
neer, and the Club; and on Appellants'
claims of negligence and nuisance against
MHTC.'s The negligence claim against Mel
Downs was also rejected?' The counts
alleginginversecondemnationagainstMHTC
were tried before a jury.'7 The jury returned
verdicts in favor of Appellants for damages
of $298,175.28 Appellants filed motions to
increase the amount awarded or for a new
859 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. banc 1993). @ 1994 Jason W. Johnson.
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trial on the issue of damages only.? MHTC
filed for judgment n.o.v., arguing thatAppel-
lants' action was barred by the original con-
demnation proceedings and the "common
enemy doctrine."a The trial court sustained
MHTC's motion and entered judgment n.o.v.
in its favor.21
The Missouri Supreme Court, upon
consideration, held: The common enemy
doctrine no longer reflects the appropriate
rule in situations involving surface water
runoff, and the Court instead adopts the rule
of reasonable use.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The issue of landowners' rights in tem-
pering the forces of nature is deeply rooted
throughout the history of property law. One
of the more confusing areas within this genre
of law is that of the control of surface waters.
In the State of Missouri, the common enemy
doctrine has govemed since 1874.2 The
original doctrine, as established in Missouri
in McCormick v. Kansas City, St. Joseph
and Council Bluff R.R. Co.,2 was as fol-
lows:
[Un the case of surface water,
which is regarded as a common
enemy, [each owner] is at liberty
to guard against it, or divert it
from his premises, provided he
exercises reasonablecareand pru-
dence in accomplishing that
object.. .[The owner of the
dominant...heritage 'must im-
prove and use his lands in a rea-
sonable way, and in so doing he
may turn the course of, and pro-
tect his own land from, the sur-
face water flowing thereon; and
he will not be liable for any inci-
dental injury occasioned to others
by the changed course in which
the water may naturally flow, and
for its increase upon the land of
others. Each proprietor...is left
to protect his own lands against
the common enemy of all.'24
Over time, Missouri courts applied the com-
monenemydoctrineindifferentways. Gradu-
ally, a series of exceptions developed as the
courts attempted to deal with the harshness
of this doctrine.? As the many different
opinions with the differing exceptions aggre-
gated, reconciliation of the various prece-
dents became impossible.26
Before the instant case, the doctrine
used in Missouri was actually a "modified"
common enemy doctrine. This doctrine
differed from the original common enemy
doctrine in that there were many exceptions
not previously in existence. For example,
the dominant (upper) landowner could not
use impoundment (i.e. a reservoir) or artifi-
cial ditching to discharge surface water onto
a lower tenement in "accelerated volume.""
Likewise, the owner of a lower tenement
could notuse impoundmentorartificial ditch-
ing to discharge surface water in an acceler-
ated volume onto a dominant tenement?
The lower tenement could use a levee or
embankment to stop the flow of surface
water.? "Surface water" included overflow
flooding from rivers and streams.? A domi-
nant landowner could, with immunity, alter
the grade of his land so long as the surface
waterwas not accelerated involume onto the
lower tenement via impoundment or artifi-
cial ditching.31 Lower land owners had
considerable freedom in blocking the flow of
water onto their lands; however they could
not dam a natural drainway." A landowner
"may dam againstsurfacewater even though
in doing so he casts it back upon his neigh-
bor" - provided the landowner did not
"gather it and discharge it at one place to the
injury of an adjoining owner."" Upper
landowners may have had to use some
degree of care when discharging surface
water onto lower lands.M A lower land-
owner needed no pure motive or good faith
in blocking the water.?
As is obvious, the various exceptions
were confusing and difficult to apply. "This
opacity of the law, or perhaps more appro-
priately 'muddying of surface water,' re-
sulted from a failure to ... discem that the
common enemy doctrine applied solely to
surface water in its natural diffused state, not
after it was artificially collected and acceler-
ated in volume."" This opacity was evident




22 See Pollock v. Rose, 708 S.W.2d 218 (Mo. CL App. 1986), Camden Special Road District v. Taylor, 495 S.W.2d 93,96 (Mo. CL App. 1973), Heins Implement Co. v.
Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission, 859 S.W.2d at 686; all citing Abbott v. Kansas City, St Joseph & Council Bluffs R.R. Co., 83 Mo. 271, 286 (1884).
23 57 Mo. 433(1874).
24 Heins, 859 S.W.2d at 686 (quoting McCormick v. Kansas City, St Joseph and Council Bluff RR. Co., 57 Mo. 433,438 (1874)).
25 Id.
26 Bromwn v. H & D Duenne Farms, Inc. 799 S.W.2d 621,628 (Mo. CL App. 1990).
27 Rychlicke v. St. Louis, 98 Mo. 497, 11 S.W. 1001 (1889).
28 Mehomay v. Foster, 111 S.W. 882 (Mo. CL App. 1908).
29 Gall v. Chicago & A. R.R. Co., 271 Mo. 655, 197 S.W. 244 (1917). See also Anderson v. Inter-River Drainage, 309 Mo. 189,274 S.W. 448 (1925), City of Hardin
v. Norbome Land Drainage, 360 Mo. 1112, 232 S.W.2d 921 (1950).
30 Goll, 271 Mo. 655.
31 Casanover v. Villanova Realty, 209 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. CL App. 1948).
32 Happy v. Kenton, 247 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Mo. 1952).
33 Gibson v. Sharp. 277 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. CL App. 1955).
34 Heins, 859 S.W.2d at 687 (quoting Looney v. Hindman, 649 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Mo. banc 1983); see also Hansen v. Naugle Construction Co., 801 S.W.2d 71, 75 (Mo.
banc 1990)).
35 Millard Farms v. Sprock, 829 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. App. 1991).
36 Camden Special Road District v. Taylor, 495 S.W.2d at 97 (Mo. App. 1973). 0 7
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problem of diffuse surface water. In re-
sponse, American courts have developed (in
addition to the common enemy doctrine)
two other approaches in dealing with prob-
lems involving diffuse surface water: The
civil law rule (also called the natural flow rule),
and the reasonable use rule.Y
The common enemy doctrine remains
in a few jurisdictions."a The doctrine first
appeared in Massachusetts39 , and is based
"on an exaggerated view of the notion of
absolute ownership of land."40 The original
formulation of the doctrine is as follows:
Therightof apartyto thefreeand
unfettered control of his own land
above, upon and beneath the sur-
face cannot be interfered with or
restrained by any considerations
of injury to others which may be
occasioned by the flow of mere
surface water in consequence of
the lawful appropriation of land
by its owner to a particular use or
mode of enjoyment 41
The doctrine "completely ignores the
fact that invasion by an unwanted and de-
structive volume of water might otherwise
have been viewed as a classic trespass."a
The practical consequence of adherence to
this rule has been described as "a neighbor-
hood contest between pipes and dikes from
which 'breach of the peace is often inevi-
table.'"43
The civil law rule" "appears to be
derived from the French and Spanish civil
codes, which in turn have their roots in
Roman law."45 It imposes liability for any
interference with the natural surface drain-
age pattern that subsequently causes injury
to another's land." Under this theory, a
landowner whose property is elevated is not
allowed to retain any water that would natu-
rally drain out of it.47 A lower-elevated
landowner "is obliged to accept the water
that would naturally drain into it," and the
land is functionally subject to an easement
for the flow of surface water.' Many courts
rejected the civil law rule "out of concern that
it would impede the development of land and
thus would retard the march of progress [and
development]." 49 Courts also encountered
an evidentiary problem as it was difficult to
determine "what was the exact course of the
'natural flow' of the surface water before
bulldozers arrived on the scene."'
Neither the civil law rule nor the com-
mon enemy doctrine has proved very func-
tional. A prime example of this fact is that
"courts applying these ostensibly opposite
rules often reach similar results."s' Over
time, "the two doctrines have been labori-
ously drifting towards confluence...and to-
ward the third doctrine of water use,"52 - the
"reasonable use doctrine."
The rule of reasonable use, first applied
in New Hampshire,m is not really a rule at all.
There are no bright lines or guidelines. It
does not afford any specific rights to land-
owners. Instead, the rule "leaves each case
to be determined on its own facts, in accor-
dance with general principles of fairness and
common sense. "s As a consequence of the
case-by-case application, precedent can be
only of limited value. What may make sense
under one set of circumstances may not in
another set of seemingly similar circum-
stances.
An interesting aspect of the reasonable
use doctrine is its dual nature. It is applied as
both a tort (characterizing interference with
the flow of surface water so as to inflict
personal injury on another - "an invasion of
one's use and enjoyment of land") ' and as a
property law concept (a form of nuisance).5 6
Under either theory, the ideology is the
same: "eachpossessorislegally privileged to
make a reasonable use of his land, even
though the flow of surface waters is altered
thereby and causes some harm to others,
(but is liable if the harm) is unreasonable." 7
The reasonableness standard is a question of
fact, determined in each case by a risk/utility
analysisweighing the defendant's acts against
37 &e generally Heins, 859 S.W.2d at 688.
38 The common enemy doctrine exists in these jurisdictions: Gillespie Land & Inigation Co. v. Gonzalez, 379 P.2d 135, 146 (Ariz. 1963); Ballaidv. Ace Wrecking Co., 289
A.2d 888,890 (D.C. 1971);Argyelanv. Haviland, 435 N.E.2d 973,976 (Ind. 1982); State Dept of Highwaysv. Feenan, 752 P.2d 182,184 (Mont 1988); Buffalo Sewer Auth.
v. Town of Cheektowaga, 228 N.E.2d 386, 389 (N.Y. 1967).
39 Gannon v. Hargadon, 10 Allen 106, 110 (Mass. 1865).
40 Heins, 859 S.W.2d at 688.
41 Gannon, 10 Allen at 110.
42 Heins, 859 S.W.2d at 689.
43 Id. (quoting from R. Timothy Weston, Gone With the Water Drainage Rights and Storm Water Management in Pennsylvania, 22 Vau. L REv. 901, 908 (1977)).
44 Courts that follow the dvil law rule include: Fisher v. Space of Pensacola, Inc., 483 So.2d 392, 393 (Ala. 1986); Dougan v. Rossville Drainage Dist., 757 P.2d 272, 275
(Kan. 1988); Lee v. Schultz, 374 N.W.2d 87,90 (S.D. 1985); Powers v. Judd, 553 A.2d 139, 140 (VL 1988).





50 Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735, 738 (R.L 1975).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See City of Franklin v. Durgee, 51 A. 911 (N.H. 1901).
54 Id. at 7.
55 Kinyon & McClure, 24 Mm. L Rev. at 936-38; RESTATEM r (SECOND) OF ToaMs § 833 (1977.
56 Highview North Apartments v. County of Ramsey, 323 N.W.2d 65. 72 (Minn. 1982); Bush v. City of Rochester, 255 N.W. 256 (Minn. 1934).
57 Heins, 859 S.W.2d at 689 (quoting Annstrong v. Francis Corp., 120 A.2d 4,8 (N.J. 1956)).
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the plaintiffs injuries." Today, most states
have adopted the reasonable use rule, while
some others have added a reasonableness
requirement to their existing common en-
emy or civil rule approach59 As mentioned
above, a few courts still apply the common
enemy doctrine or the civil law rule, or
different rules for different situations."
W. THE INsTANT DECISION
The Missouri Supreme Court decided
in the present case to abandon the "modi-
fied" common enemy doctrine, and to adopt
the reasonable use rule.61 "Mhe common
enemy doctrine, even as modified, has out-
lived its usefulness in our state."" The Court
stated that the "labyrinth of exceptions are
unduly complicated and confusing and
threaten arbitrary and unjust results."" The
Court believed that the rule of reasonable use
is most likely to promote the optimum devel-
opment and enjoyment of land, and that the
rule will ensure the equitable distribution of
costs, while maintaining enough flexibility to
apply as different factual situations so man-
date."
The Court noted that this standard of
reasonableness harmonizes with tenets of
Missouri law already in existence." For
example, reasonable use concepts already
govern the rights of users of Missouri water-
courses, subterranean streams, and subter-
ranean percolating waters." In the instant
case, MHTC had the power to exercise
eminent domain in building the Highway 65
bypass (via § 227.120 RSMo 1986).7 The
Court cited Haferkamp v. City of Rock
Hill in deciding whether such "taking," as
allowed under the eminent domain statute,
applies in situations where the common
enemy doctrine is invoked."9 "If defendants'
acts in disposing of the surface water were
within the permitted limits, there could be no
taking or damaging of plaintiffs' property
within the meaning of Art I, § 26, Constitu-
tion of Missouri 1945."70 The Court con-
cluded, therefore, that even if there were
measurable damages to plaintiffs' property
due to the defendant diverting the flow of
excess surface water, there can be no recov-
ery if the defendant was legally allowed to do
so. The Court extended this idea to the
reasonable use rule (substituted for the com-
mon enemy doctrine).71 "Accordingly, we
hold that when, as a result of a public works
project, private property is damaged by an
unreasonable diversion of surface waters,
whether by design or by mistake, the owner
may bring an action for inverse condemna-
tion."72 The extent and regularity of the
flooding caused by the bypass, combined
with MHTC's negligence in installing inad-
equate drainage, "would be sufficient to
allow a jury to find an unreasonable use (and
therefore inverse condemnation)."n The
Court then remanded the case to the trial
court, because the original jury instructions
were unavailable.74 The Court stated that if
the original instructions are consistent with
the principles of an inverse condemnation
claim, judgment for the plaintiff should be
entered;h if not, a new trial should be
awarded.76
58 See generally Pendergrast v. Aiken, 236 S.E.2d 787,797 (N.C. 1977).
59 According to Heins fn.13, the following jurisdictions have adopted the reasonable use nde: Weinberg v. Northern Alaska Dev. Corp., 384 P.2d 450,452 (Alaska 1963);
Page Motor Co., Inc. v. Baker, 438 A.2d 739, 741 (Conn. 1980); Weldin Farms, Inc. v. Glassman, 414 A.2d 500, 505 (Del. Super. Ct 1980); Westland Skating Center, Inc.
v. Gus Machado Buick, 542 So.2d 959,962 (Fla. 1989); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509,516 (Haw. 1970); lutey v. Commonwealth, Dept of Highways, 428 S.W.2d 766,
769 (Ky. 1967); Tucker v. Badoian, 384 N.E.2d 1195,1201 (Mass. 1978); Enderson v. Kelehan, 32 N.W.2d 286, 289 (Minn. 1948); Hall v. Wood, 443 So.2d 834, 840 (Miss.
1983); County of Clark v. Powers, 611 P.2d 1072, 1076 (Nev. 1980); City of Franklin v. Durgee, 51 A. 911, 913 (N.H. 1901); Amstrong v. Francis Corp., 120 A.2d 4, 10
(N.J. 1956); Pendergrast v. Aiken, 236 S.E.2d 787, 796 (N.C. 1977); Jones v. Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d 897, 904 (N.D. 1967); McGlashan v. Spade Rockledge Terrace Condo
Dev. Corp., 402 N.E. 2d 1196, 1200 (Ohio 1980); Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735, 740 (R.I. 1975); Sanford v. University of Utah, 488 P.2d 741, 744 (Utah 1971); Morris
Associates, Inc. v. Priddy, 383 S.E.2d 770, 774 (W.Va. 1989); State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407,416 (Wis. 1974).
According toHefns fn.13, the following jurisdictions have imposed a reasonableness requirement upon the civil law rule: Keys v. Ronley, 412 P.2d 529,536-37 (Cal. 1966);
Ternpletonv. Huss, 311 N.E.2d 141,146 (111. 1974); Burgess v. Salmon RiverCanal Co., 805 P.2d 1223,1230 (Idaho 1991); OToolv. Hathaway, 461 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Iowa
1990); Whitman v. Fomay, 31 A.2d 630, 633 (Md. 1943).
States that have done so for the common enemy doctrine include: Pirtlev. Opco, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 265, 267 (Ark. 1980); Mattoonv. City of Norman, 617 P.2d 1347, 1349
(Okla. 1980); hwin v. Michelin Tire Corp., 341 S.E.2d 783, 785 (S.C. 1986); Mullins v. Greer, 311 S.E.2d 110, 112 (Va. 1984).
60 See in. 37 supra for courts still applying the civil law rule and supra note 44 for common enemy jurisdictions. Courts that observe more than one rule include- Nu-Dwarf
Farms v. Stratbucker Farms, 470 N.W.2d 772, 777 (Neb. 1991); Westbury Realty Corp. v. Lancaster Shopping Center, Inc., 152 A.2d 669, 671-72 (Pa. 1959) (modified by
statute in Pastore v. State System of Higher Ed., 618 A.2d. 1118, 1121 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992)); Kraft v. Langford, 565 S.W. 2d 223, 229 (Tex. 1978).
61 Heins, 859 S.W.2d at 690-91.
62 Id. at 690.
63 [d. at 690-91.
64 Id. at 691.
65 Id.
66 Id. See also Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161, 166 (Mo. 1964h* Higday v. Nickolas, 469 S.W.2d 859,869 (Mo. Ct. App 1971).
67 Id.
68 316 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1958)
69 Id.




74 Id. at 691-92.
75 Id. at 692.
76 Id.
77 See supra note 57. 39I~ M E LP RI
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IV. Comowr
The Court, in abandoning the common
enemy doctrine and adopting the rule of
reasonable use, has seemingly done the
prudent (if not the inevitable) thing. A large
plurality of states have either adopted the
rule or the functional facsimile of the rule?'
The reasonable use rule promotes coopera-
tionbetweenneighboringlandowners. Land-
owners now have more incentive to work
together to find a common solution to the
common enemy of surplus ground water
runoff. This differs from the common enemy
doctrine, which was extremely adversarial in
nature. Landowners could do whatever it
took to divert the flow of excess water from
their lands, regardless of what effect the
diversion had on their neighboring land-
owner. This new cooperation has beneficial
side effects as well. Municipalities will now
havetostructuretheirdrainagesystemssoas
notto posean unreasonable riskto landown-
ers. This fact will lead to better flood and
drainage planning. Furthermore, instilling
culpability will lessen damages to private and
public property, thus protecting property
values.
Another benefit of the rule of reason-
able use is its flexibility and applicability in
different situations. The consequences of
adherence to the reasonable use rule are not
as rigid or occasionally harsh as the common
enemy doctrine. As the name suggests,
there is room for reasonableness.
There are, however, some problems
with the rule of reasonable use not addressed
by the Court. There is an element of
unpredictability with the rule because of the
limited value of precedent and its case-by-
case nature. There is also the problem of
retroactivity. Will the rule apply to pre-
Heins cases? Will there be some type of
"grandfather" exception - perhaps to drain-
age projects that began X number of years
before the Heins decision? And what about
litigation pending at the time of this decision?
Another potential problem is the fact
that flood waters are treated as surface water
for purposes of this rule.78 This means that,
after flooding, new or rebuilt levees cannot
unreasonablydivertwater onto adjacent land.
Neither can they effectively dam the flood-
water so as to cause "pooling" upstream
onto other land. There is a potential for a
flood of litigation. Finally, what is the nature
of the remedies available, and in what situa-
tions do they apply? While none of these
questions are addressed by Heins, they are
discussed below:
* The unpredictability of the rule of rea-
sonable use could be problematic. Prece-
dent is of limited value, because what is
reasonable in one county in Missouri may
not be reasonable in another. For example,
jurors from a predominantly rural county
might have a different definition of reason-
able treatment of surface water than a jury
from an urban area, even if the facts in each
situation were nearly identical. This would
lead to forum shopping within the state court
system, depending upon residency of the
parties. While this discrepancy between
ruralandurbanjuriesiscertainlynotnew, the
effects on property in different areas could
be substantial. The perception of what land
ownership means may be much different in
an area where one cannot see his neighbors,
as opposed to an area where apartment
buildings thrive. Certainly the opinions of
the respective juries will reflect their social
attitude.
Inconsistent results could also occur in
the same area; just at different times. In a
time of serious flooding, one type of activity
may be reasonable; however, when weather
situations are normal, the same activity may
be unreasonable. This discrepancy may be
what the Supreme Court intended when it
lauded the "flexibility" of the rule: "The
greatest virtue of the reasonable use stan-
dard is its ability to adapt to any set of
circumstances while remaining firmly fo-
cused on the equities of the situation."79
While in theory this rule sounds good, there
could be problems in practice. At least one
court has expressly declined to extend the
rule of reasonable use to underground per-
colating waters (specifically, private wells). 0
Instead, the court kept the absolute owner-
ship right of the common enemy doctrine.81
The policy considerations were "because the
existence, origin, and movement ... of such
waters are so secret, occult, and concealed
that an attempt to administer any set of legal
rules (to them) would be . . . practically
impossible."" While this policy may not
apply in Missouri, it may be illustrative of
potential problems of determining the rea-
sonableness and difficulty of dealing with
different types of drainage water - espe-
cially subterranean water. For example,
Judge Price's critique of the common enemy
doctrine, - "invasion by an unwanted and
destructive volume of surface water
might...(be) viewed as a classic trespass." -
is interesting in that "trespass" usually in-
volves something within one's control that
encroaches onto another's land. Judge Price
extends this theoryto a natural condition (the
existence of surface water). A landowner
raising the elevation of one side of his land to
prevent water from running onto his land
could be liable for trespass if the amount of
water is unwanted and destructive. This
would be true even if the water was never in
the offending landowners's control. How-
See Campbell v. Anderson, 866 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. CL App. 1993).
Heins, 859 S.W.2d at 690.
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ever, this act seems analogous to a land-
owner putting up a privacy fence to keep
deer out of his yard. Is he guilty of a trespass
if the deer go around his fence into an
adjacent landowner's yard, doing damage to
that landowner's garden? Surely not. The
same logic should apply to surface water
cases.
* The problem of the retroactive applica-
tion of the rule of reasonable use is not
considered in Heins. It is unknown if the
Court intended retroactive as well as pro-
spective application of the rule. However,
the Missouri Court of Appeals (Western
District) offered its opinion on the issue after
the Heins case. In Campbell v. Ander-
son,ea the court said "[alt the time of trial, the
common enemy doctrine was (the rule)...the
subsequent change in the law creates an
issue...(of) whether Heins should be applied
retroactively."" The court went on to quote
Sumners v. Sumners, in which the Missouri
Supreme Court stated:
It is in the general true that the
province of an appellate court is
only to inquire whether a judg-
ment rendered was erroneous or
not. But if, subsequent to the
judgment, and before the deci-
sion of the appellate court, a law
intervenes and positively changes
the rule which governs, the law
must be obeyed, or its obligation
denied."s
The Sumners court then stated "[a]
decision overruling a prior rule of substantive
law should generally be applied retroac-
tively,"86 and developed a three-pronged test
in determining whether an overruling deci-
sion by the Missouri Supreme Court should
be given prospective effect only:
1) the decision must establish a
new principle of law by overruling
clear past precedent; 2) the court
must evaluate whether retroac-
tive application will enhance or
retard the purpose and effect of
the newly announced rule; and 3)
the court must balance the inter-
ests of those affected by the
change in the law, determine the
degree to which the parties may
have relied upon the previous
rule, and weigh the hardship the
parties might suffer from retroac-
tive application of the new rule
against the hardship to the par-
ties denied the benefit of the new
rule."
Do these quotes mean that all Missouri
courts should apply the rule retroactively?
The Sumners court seems to iridicate that
the reasonable use rule should be applied
only cases in which litigation was pending at
the time of Heins (hence the appellate court
distinction). In Campbell, the court man-
dated that the litigants should be given a new
trial in order to apply the new law.
What should occur in a case filed after
Heins involving a pre-Heins surface water
issue?" The Campbell court deals with this
issue somewhat by classifying the surface
water issue as a type of nuisance.' 9 It then
further subdivides the nuisance into "perma-
nent" or "temporary."" "A permanent
nuisance must result from a permanent con-
struction which is necessarily injurious as
installed not from one which becomes injur
ous through its use. The distinguishing
feature between a permanent and tempo-
rary nuisance is the 'abatability' of the nui-
sance."91 Once the nature of the nuisance is
determined, the applicable statute of limita-
tions begins to toll after the last injurious
event. "The action is barred if it was not filed
(within the time prescribed by the statute of
limitations) from the last successive invasion
of interest."92 Consequently it seems that if
a surface water case may be brought under
the statute of limitations, the Sumner test
would be used to see if the rule of reasonable
use would supplant the common enemy
doctrine. This should occur on a case-by-
case basis, and should apply to all courts -
not just on the appellate level. (Note: other
jurisdictions have made the reasonable use
rule retroactive to cases still pending at the
time of their decision to implement the
reasonable use ruleP3.)
* The third problem revolves around the
classification of flood water as under the
domain of the reasonable use rule. In light of
the recent flooding, new or rebuilt levees will
have to be installed so as not to unreasonably
subject neighboring land to the risk of dam-
age. Also, if the rule is retroactive, this could
impute a huge amount of liability on the state
or municipality that owns the levee system.
Such liability would, of course, be contingent
on the jury's finding of the unreasonableness
of the levee structure. Under the common
enemy doctrine, no such liability would be
found. Different standards of reasonable-
ness may have to apply to different structures
83 866 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. CL App. 1993).
84 Id. at 144.
85 Id., quoting Sumners v. Sumners, 701 S.W.2d 720, 722-23 (Mo. banc 1985).
86 Id. quoting Sumners, 701 S.W.2d at 723.
87 Id. quoting Sumners, 701 S.W.2d at 724.
88 An example is: A builds a ditch which diverts water onto X's land in 1988. Previously, the common enemy doctrine governed, and A's act would be OK. Under current
law, however, A's act is unreasonable. The suit Is filed after the change in law, for an act that occurred well before the change. Is it fair to hold A's conduct in 1988 to the 1993
standard? The Campbell court indicated that it may depend on the "permanence" of the construction.
89 Campbell, 866 S.W.2d at 142.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 143, quoting Racine v. Glendale Shooting Club, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
92 Id. (Note: The court stated that the statute of limitations for the temporary nuisance was 5 years and could be found InMo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120, 1986.)
93 See Yonad v. Homestead Country Homes, 127 A.2d 198, 202 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1956) (implementing a reasonable time and interest of justice test).
41I ~ME LP RI
Vol. 2 * No. 1
as well. For example, Bagnell Dam is a
permanent structure, built when the state
applied the common enemy doctrine. It
should not be subject to the same reason-
ableness standard as temporary diversions of
surface water, which are easily rebuilt to
conform to the new rule. This would require,
however, a balancing of the statute of limita-
tions and the requirements of the Sumner
test. It may also require an age exception
("grandfather" clause).
An example of this type of
"grandfathering" problem occurred in
Campbell. The re-channeling project was
almost seven years old when the case was
filed, and fifteen years old by the time a
judgment was rendered." While the court
found the re-channeling to be temporary, the
fact is that the owner, benefitting from his re-
channeling, had invested a lot of time and
money. His investment camewhen Missouri
followed the common enemy doctrine. While
the court concluded that the owner had in no
way relied on the common enemy doctrine
when he rechannelled the creek, this is
illustrative of the difficulty of applying the
rule of reasonable use in some cases. This is
also demonstrative of the delicate manner in
which courts may have to apply the Sumner
test. Also, since the Campbell court or-
dered a new trial,96 the issue is not resolved
in an efficient manner. Thatcasedragged on
for several years. Such delay is probably not
what the Missouri Supreme Court contem-
plated in these cases.
In the design of levees, municipal drain-
age systems, bridges, roads, and even resi-
dential grading, the Campbell decision
would require that such projects be done so
as not to unreasonably expose neighboring
land to the risk of excess drainage. This may
result in skyrocketing costs. Under the old
rule, each landowner was to fend for them-
selves. Now, extra steps will have to be taken
to ensure that no unreasonable damage
could occur. This rule may be appropriate
when applied to government projects, which
are presumably for the good of the citizenry.
However, if this theory is strictly applied to
private landowners, it would be contrary to
the autonomy of land ownership. The rea-
sonable use standard should be modified in
private landowner cases to strike a fair com-
promise between a landowner fending for
him/herself and taking care of everyone
else.
* The last problem deals with the relief
available. Should the relief be prospective
(i.e. injunctive relief) or retroactive (i.e. com-
pensation for damages)? In cases involving
conditions created afterHeins, any damages
obviously should be compensated fully as per
the relief requested. Common sense indi-
cates that for any cases involving a pre-
Heins condition, however, the only relief
that can be granted is some type of injunctive
relief.
It would be inherently unfair to assess
monetary damages on a landowner who had
created a condition while the common en-
emy doctrine was in force, even if the land-
owner had not consciously contemplated the
doctrine in designing the condition. Injunc-
tive relief in such a situation is fair, as it
affords the offending landowner a chance to
correct the condition pursuant to the newly-
adopted rule without financially penalizing
the . This also gives a plaintiff some reward




While the decision in Heins finally uni-
fies the State's treatment of excess surface
water and flood drainage, there are still
problems that need to be addressed by the
Missouri Supreme Court. Resolution of
these problems will effectuate a smooth and
fair transition from the common enemy doc-
trine to the rule of reasonable use.
94 Campbell, 866 S.W.2d at 139-141.
95 Id. at 144.
96 Id. at 145.
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